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I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A 
DISSOLVED CORPORATION CANNOT ENFORCE ITS 
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS. 
This is a quiet title lawsuit challenging the procedure employed to 
accomplish a county tax sale. The central issue of this appeal is whether or not the 
district court erred in determining that Diamond T. Developments, Inc., a 
dissolved corporation, could not enforce its contractual rights in a quiet title 
action. The general rule is that contracts of a corporation made prior to its 
dissolution survive the dissolution and are enforceable. See, 19 C.J.S. 
Corporations § 951 and 19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 2888. This is also the 
principle which was followed by the Utah Supreme Court in Falconaero Enterprise 
v. Valley Investment Company, 395 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964). This is also the 
existing statutory law. See, Utah Code Annotated § 16- 10a-1405(2). Since the 
Falconaero decision was issued the Utah Court of Appeals issued the Holman v. 
Callister, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ruling in which the Court stated that 
a dissolved corporation could not enforce a malpractice claim. In the matter at 
hand, the trial court misplaced reliance upon the Holman v. Callister decision. 
With the trial court relying entirely upon the Holman decision, the trial court 
misapplied the law relating to dissolution of corporations. The district court 
should have followed the Falconaero case. 
Appellees have not attempted to distinguish the Falconaero case which 
allowed a dissolved corporation to maintain a quiet title lawsuit. Appellees have 
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not even addressed that issue nor have they addressed Utah Code Annotated § 16-
10a-1405(2) which specifically states that dissolution of a corporation does not 
prevent a proceeding by or against a dissolved corporation in its corporate name. 
"Proceeding" is defined under Utah Code Annotated § 16-10a-102(26) as 
including a "civil suit, arbitration or mediation, and a criminal, administrative or 
an investigatory action." Thus, the action of Diamond T. Developments, Inc. to 
enforce contractual rights by way of a quiet title lawsuit is consistent with 
applicable law. 
The Falconaero decision is applicable to this case instead of the Holman 
case because the right which Appellant seeks to enforce is a quiet title action based 
upon a contractual right that arose prior to dissolution. The Falconaero case was 
also a quiet title case. In fact, the Holman holding was very specific and narrowly 
stated by concluding "that these statutes do not allow a dissolved corporation to 
pursue claims for malpractice after it has ceased to exist in any manner as a 
corporate entity." There was no discussion of the Falconaero decision to 
distinguish the holdings. The contractual right of Diamond T. Developments, Inc. 
existed at the time of the improper tax sale. The improper tax sale occurred in 
June 1999. It is undisputed that the interest of Diamond T. Developments was of 
record at that time because the contract had been recorded as of September 1981. 
R. 36. Weber County failed to even attempt to provide Diamond T. Developments 
with notice of the upcoming tax sale. R. 37. Because its interest was of record and 
because existing statutes at the time (Utah Code Ann. Sec 16-10a-1405(2)(e)) 
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specifically authorize dissolved corporations to bring lawsuits in their corporate 
name, the interest of Diamond T. Developments could not properly be cut off by 
the procedure employed by Weber County and further the district court could not 
properly rule that Diamond T. Developments, Inc. had no statutory right to bring 
this action. 1 
The district court did not properly analyze the central issue of this case, 
made an incorrect ruling on the motion for summary judgment, and left nothing in 
the case to try by virtue of its ruling on the motion for summary judgment. That 
single ruling should be reversed and the case remanded. The trial court should 
have applied the existing corporate statutes and further should have applied the 
Falconaero case, rather than the Holman case. 
The Appellee has failed to address the Falconaero case and the above 
referenced Utah Code Sections. Appellees' failure to address these arguments is 
indicative that said arguments are dispositive because Appellees have not 
presented any case law or statutory law contrary to Appellant's position which is 
that contracts made prior to dissolution can be enforced by that entity after 
dissolution. This court should reverse the trial court's ruling and allow for further 
consistent proceedings. 
1 The old statute (Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 and 101 (repealed 1992)) is not applicable because 
Appellant's interest was of record in 1999 when the improper tax sale occurred. Appellant had no 
knowledge of any invalid tax sale while the old statutes was in effect (up through 1992) and did not obtain 
accrual of its cause of action until the improper tax sale took place in 1999. 
3 
II THE ISSUE DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS A LEGAL 
ISSUE ON WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN RULE. 
Appellee has argued that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this 
matter. This argument fails because Appellant seeks review of the district court's 
decision on the underlying motion for summary judgment. The effect of that 
decision was to terminate the case because of the central issue of the statutory 
right of the plaintiff to even proceed. Appellant believes that the district court 
erred in issuing its ruling on the motion for summary judgment based upon 
interpretation of the law and is entitled to a review thereof. This is a legal, not a 
factual issue. The essential facts brought forward to the date of the motion for 
summary judgment are not in dispute. The effect of the law or how the law is 
interpreted is what is in dispute. 
Appellant needs to be able to obtain appellate review of that decision which 
Appellant believes to be contrary to law. If Appellee's jurisdictional argument 
were adopted, Appellant would have no effective right to appeal. In other words, 
this court should not dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, because 
the jurisdictional question is without merit, this court should reach the merits of 
this appeal. Under Utah appellate law, appellate courts have jurisdiction to 
entertain an appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment if it involves a 
legal issue. See, Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 174 P.3d 1, 5 (Utah 
App. 2007). Because the issue decided by the district court was based upon 
undisputed facts and it is a question or law, this Court has the ability to review the 
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trial court's decision and determine whether or not that legal decision was in error. 
Therefore, this court does have jurisdiction to proceed to hear this appeal on the 
merits. 
I l l . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY THE LAW CORRECTLY TO 
THE FACTS AT HAND. 
The Appellees are focusing on "genuine issues of material fact". This was 
not the basis for the court's ruling. The court issued its ruling based upon its 
understanding of the law, not based upon a genuine issue of material fact. 
Therefore, the court should review the legal theory adopted by the trial court and 
determine whether or not that was appropriate. If that was not appropriate then the 
ruling on the motion for summary judgment should be reversed. This Court 
should then remand for further proceedings consistent with a corrected ruling on 
the motion for summary judgment. 
It is clear that Weber County did not even attempt to provide notice of the 
tax sale to Appellant. This alone should invalidate the tax sale. Weber County is 
under an absolute strict duty to follow the procedures outlined in the code. See, 
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1938). 
To be valid, a tax sale must be conducted according to the strict requirements of 
the governing statutes. See, Page v. McAfee, 26 Utah 2d 208, 487 P.2d 861, 862 
(1971), see also, Massey v. Griffiths, 131 P.3d 243 (Utah 2005). Weber County 
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did not provide notice, nor does it state that it even attempted to provide notice to 
Diamond T. Developments, Inc. R. 37. Therefore, because the tax sale was 
inappropriate, the court should allow for Diamond T. Developments, Inc., even in 
its dissolved state, to challenge that sale. Defendant fails to address the issue of 
whether or not an involuntarily dissolved entity has the ability to challenge a tax 
sale. Rather, Defendants seeks to divert the court's attention to other irrelevant 
factors. When all is said and done, the tax sale did not follow the proper 
procedure for lack of notice and the Appellees cannot defend that improper 
procedure. The only question is whether or not Diamond T. Developments, Inc., 
as a dissolved entity can challenge that issue. The trial court decided that 
Diamond T. Developments, Inc. could not so challenge it. However, as is set forth 
in this brief and in Appellant's opening brief, significant case law and statutory 
law allows for a dissolved corporation to enforce its contractual rights in a quiet 
title lawsuit. This means that this Court should correct the trial court's 
understanding of the law and allow for the trial court to proceed consistent 
therewith rather than inconsistent therewith. 
IV . THE POTENTIAL TRANSFER OF CONTRACT RIGHTS IS NOT AN 
ATTEMPT TO RAISE A NEW ISSUE. 
Appellees seek to persuade this court that the issue of whether or not the 
contractual rights of Diamond T. Developments, Inc. as a dissolved corporation 
has been transferred to its principals and/or allow the principals to have been 
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substituted into the action to enforce the contractual rights is not a new issue. The 
court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment effectively precluded any 
discussion of such issues and therefore, Appellant is merely showing the Court 
that a potentially important issue has been ignored because of the effect of the 
ruling. Plaintiffs do not seek to ask this court to address that issue but seek for this 
court to reverse the court's ruling on the appealed issue. This is a legal theory that 
was foreclosed from being addressed at the trial court level and which should be 
considered as a possible issued to potentially be raised at the trial court level after 
proper resolution of the motion for summary judgment. See, Wayment v. Howard, 
144 P.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Utah 2006) (finding that theories foreclosed from being 
addressed at trial by a denial of a motion for summary judgment may be heard on 
appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
The legal issue on appeal is the application of the law concerning the 
ability of a dissolved entity to challenge the validity of a tax sale in a quiet title 
action. Appellees have failed to respond to this issue. Instead, Appellees have 
raised other issues which do not affect the point of law which the Court is 
requested to resolve. Because there is no compelling argument to the contrary, 
Appellant's argument concerning the status of a dissolved entity carries more 
weight and should be adopted by this Court. This means that this Court should 
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overturn the decision of the trial court concerning status of the dissolved entity and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 9^_ day of May, 2008. 
I. Darin Hammond 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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